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ABSTRACT
A Novel Authentication and Validation Mechanism for
Analyzing Syslogs Forensically
by
Steena D. S. Monteiro, Master of Science
Utah State University, 2008
Major Professor: Dr. Robert F. Erbacher
Department: Computer Science
This research proposes a novel technique for authenticating and validating syslogs
for forensic analysis. This technique uses a modification of the Needham Schroeder
protocol, which uses nonces (numbers used only once) and public keys. Syslogs, which
were developed from an event-logging perspective and not from an evidence-sustaining
one, are system treasure maps that chart out and pinpoint attacks and attack attempts.
Over the past few years, research on securing syslogs has yielded enhanced syslog
protocols that focus on tamper prevention and detection. However, many of these
protocols, though efficient from a security perspective, are inadequate when forensics
comes into play. From a legal perspective, any kind of evidence found at a crime scene
needs to be validated. In addition, any digital forensic evidence when presented in court
needs to be admissible, authentic, believable, and reliable. Currently, a patchy log on the
server side and client side cannot be considered as formal authentication of a wrongdoer.
This work presents a method that ties together, authenticates, and validates all the entities
involved in the crime scene—the user using the application, the system that is being used,
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and the application being used on the system by the user. This means that instead of
merely transmitting the header and the message, which is the standard syslog protocol
format, the syslog entry along with the user fingerprint, application fingerprint, and
system fingerprint are transmitted to the logging server. The assignment of digital
fingerprints and the addition of a challenge response mechanism to the underlying
syslogging mechanism aim to validate generated syslogs forensically.
(61 pages)
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
1.1 Background
Computer evidence has become an indispensible factor in proving criminal and
civil cases in a court of law. Previously, the lack and/or misinterpretation of computer
evidence have been the primary causes for stalling the pursuit of computer crime
cases in court. Due to the lack of a formal forensic procedure, the interpretation of
computer evidence at a crime scene has been often best left to expert witness
testimonies. The federal rules of evidence now consider and treat computer evidence
as they would documentary evidence. This means that like documentary evidence,
computer evidence needs to be verified and authenticated. It is now mandatory for
forensic computer expert witnesses to be able to concretely verify and defend their
observations and inferences with regard to the processes followed and the tools used
at the crime scene. Therefore, it is extremely important that computer evidence
processing be done correctly in criminal cases. A crucial aspect of computer evidence
is the documentation associated with it [1].
1.2 Syslog BSD
Syslogs, as defined by the syslog Berkeley software distribution (BSD) protocol,
were developed as event reporting systems. This protocol aimed to serve as an
indication that events with certain priorities occurred over time on a network. The
protocol assumes every entity to be independent of each other and does not provide
for any kind of binding mechanism in place when events are associated with multiple

2
entities on the network. The syslog protocol was devised with the following
fundamental tenets in mind.
1.2.1

Simplicity

Syslogs rely on the integrity of the underlying system that implements it for its
security. The original BSD protocol does not have any security considerations in place
for securing or protecting the messages that are transferred to and from the systems on
the network and the central logging repository. Therefore, after the transmission of a
syslog message, no explicit notification is sent out to the system that generates it.
With protocol simplicity as the basic focus, UDP is the designated protocol used [2]
to transmit syslogs generated by the systems on the network to a centralized logging
system. The simple format of a syslog entry and the vulnerable protocol used to transmit
it makes syslogs very unsubstantial evidence and causes the integrity of the entries can be
challenged [3].

1.2.2

Flexibility

Syslogs are flexible in the sense that an administrator on a network can configure
logging settings and logging paths. This means that the .conf file can be modified in order
to change logging settings on the network. Additionally, the administrator can determine
the message logging procedure. For example, messages of higher priority get logged on a
different server, messages signaling the launch of applications to another, etc.
Thus, having been developed as electronic signaling systems for a network, syslogs
do not have any mechanism in place that meets the security goals of authenticity,
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confidentiality, and integrity. With this as the prime focus, security research has focused
on cementing the existing syslog with various new techniques and methods.
1.3 Syslog Security Research
Security research has worked on enhancing syslogs in two ways: remodeling the
existing syslog protocol and suggesting various architectures, which add a level of
security to log files as a whole. This is discussed in Chapter 2, which looks at the
background of syslogs and their security.
1.4

Syslog Tools
In order for any kind of evidence to be used in a court of law, it has to be deemed as

admissible, authentic, believable, and reliable. Currently, there are several commercial
tools available in the market that can be used to analyze the humongous amount of
information that syslogs contain. These tools basically classify the information that a log
file contains. Another trait common to all these tools is that none of them assigns any
kind of forensic credibility to the entities involved in the generation of log entries.
Further, most tools concentrate all attention on the final and central log file, and the
collation and categorization of the information that it contains [4].
1.5 Importance of This Research
!

Electronic evidence in a court of law is now treated in the same way as
documentary evidence. This means that similar to its real-world counterpart,
electronic evidence needs to satisfy similar phases of evidence authentication and
validation. Thus, electronic evidence has to be made admissible, authentic,
believable, and reliable.
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!

Forensic analysis can never be carried out on the actual artifact. The analysis is
required to be carried out on copies of the artifact. The method proposed in this
research satisfies this requirement, thereby satisfying a crucial forensic
requirement.

!

The mechanism proposed in this research has successfully assigned an identity,
i.e., a fingerprint, to every entity involved in the generation of a syslog entry,
thereby overwriting the principle of the original syslog BSD that emphasizes the
independence of every entity.

!

An attacker who attacks a network and causes havoc will firstly seek to eliminate
any kind of evidence that indicates the presence of the attack or the attacker. In
the event of either of these occurring, an alternate mechanism is needed whereby
the system can be brought back up again and recovered to a stable state. The
technique presented in this research accomplishes this.

!

An important aspect to be noted is that the proposed method clearly satisfies the
following authentication requirements of electronic evidence documented by the
Computer Crime and Intellectual Property Section, Criminal Division, United
States Department of Justice [5]:
1. Verification of the authenticity and prevention of the alteration of computer
records. This is achieved through the use of the authentication traces and the
challenge response mechanism.
2.

Establishment of the reliability of computer programs. This is achieved
through the use of application fingerprints.
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3.

Identification of the author of computer-stored records. This is achieved
through the use of user fingerprints.
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CHAPTER 2
SYSLOGS
2.1 Syslogs Thus Far
This research provides a mechanism that validates and authenticates syslogs for
computer forensic analysis. Syslogs are often smoking guns [6] in an organization
wherein a computer or network attack has occurred due to the immense amount of
information contained therein. Syslogs may also contain evidence of illegal or
inappropriate activity by the user of an individual system. Traditionally, when computer
evidence needs to be collected, the entire system is taken off-line, and the entire hard
drive treated as evidence. With a network attack, there could be evidence in syslog files
throughout the entire organization. This makes it unfeasible to take the systems with
potential evidence off-line, especially when considering the frequency at which network
based attacks actually occur. Since syslog entries are traditionally duplicated on a central
repository, the syslog facility provides a means by which the evidence can be collected
without taking systems off-line, assuming of course the syslog files can be made to be
legally admissible.
Computer forensics, a relatively new field of research, needs a method with
appropriate authentication mechanisms in place by which syslogs can be used as relevant
evidence in court. Syslogs, which have been designed more from an event logging
perspective than an evidence-oriented one, are system treasure maps that chart and
pinpoint attacks and attack attempts. More importantly, syslogs have primarily remained
what they originally were—insufficient and cryptic [7]. Over the past few years, research
on securing syslogs has yielded enhanced syslog protocols that focus primarily on tamper
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prevention and detection. However, many of these protocols, though effective from a
security perspective, are inadequate when forensics needs comes into play.
Over the past years, system log research has focused on securing syslogs and has
advanced a great deal [8] [9] [10]. However, syslog security research cannot validate
syslog entries or vouch for their authenticity with regard to the time of their creation.
Therefore, what is needed is a mechanism that can validate every entity associated with a
syslog entry for the log entry to be forensically viable.
The BSD syslog protocol documents one of the fundamental tenets of the syslog to be
simplicity. With this as the basic focus, UDP is used [2] to transmit syslogs generated by
the systems on the network to a centralized logging system. The simple format of the
syslog entry and the vulnerable protocol used to transmit it makes syslogs very weak
evidence; this is mainly because the integrity of syslog entries can be challenged [3].
The goal of the research presented here is to create a forensically viable syslog
facility. There exists a fine difference between secure syslogs and forensically viable
ones. Security research on logs has focused on securing audit logs and protecting them
from intrusion and malicious manipulations. To the best of our knowledge, no research
has focused extensively on making syslogs forensically viable. This essentially entails the
validation of syslog entries as they are created as well as providing resistance and the
detection of modifications and deletions.
2.2 Background of the Proposed Method
Every computer-based activity on a system typically leaves an electronic trace [6].
The level of understandability provided by these traces and the credibility offered by
them depends on the level of security in place on the system. Electronic traces in
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verifiable forms can be considered as digital evidence. In order to verify system log files,
we must ensure that the log files are resistant to deletions and modifications; i.e., it may
not be possible to prevent truncation of a log file, but such modifications must be
detectable. Additionally, further verification must be added to the syslog protocol to
validate where the syslog entries came from. Specifically, this is done using system
fingerprints, user fingerprints, and application fingerprints.
In this research, we propose a new electronic trace by using a modification of the
Needham Schroeder protocol [11]. The secure transmission of system fingerprints, user
fingerprints, and application fingerprints is ensured by using a modification of the
Needham Schroeder protocol. This protocol was developed to secure communication
between two hosts by the use of session keys, random numbers, and nonces. In this
method, the session keys are replaced by public keys for each system on the network. We
term the public keys assigned to every authentic system KSystem. Similar to the original
protocol, these keys are generated pseudo randomly at the authentication module and are
assigned to each of the systems. The weakness of the Needham Schroeder protocol lies in
the use of timestamps. In the originally suggested protocol, timestamps were used
explicitly. The use of timestamps explicitly enables the manipulation of messages by
changing the network clock and manipulating network latency. However, this is
eliminated in our proposed version due to the use of digital fingerprints, which are hashed
values of various system parameters and timestamps.

2.3 Previous Syslog Research
Syslogs, developed as a UNIX protocol, are essentially a means of keeping track of
events that occur and processes that run on a system. Syslogs are essential, but vastly
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insufficient and cryptic. This is because syslogs were not designed from the perspective
of being used as evidence or for backtracking an attack.
Waters et al. [10] present a searchable and secure audit log using asymmetric key
encryption. However, this paper merely tackles the problem of storing syslogs and
providing an efficient mechanism for searching through them. The paper does not have
any mechanism in place to verify that the entries are generated by validated systems and
have indeed been created by systems within the secure domain. An analysis after an
attack would not yield sufficient evidence if this method were used. Linear hash
mechanisms that detect log tampering attempts have been suggested [9]. Ayrapetov et al.
[8] provide techniques that secure a syslog database using passwords. Again, this
technique lacks a mechanism to control or prevent attacks that can be carried out to
manipulate the syslog database. Both these papers fail to present an analysis of attacks
against their proposed systems.
The approach in [12] presents the use of four entities—a generator server, a storage
server, an analyzer server, and a sign server. This approach describes a secure
infrastructure that signs the generated logs and stores them securely. However, this paper
does not go into probing the forensic aspect of the method and how the logs secured by
this technique can be proven to be generated by a valid and authenticated source.
The method presented in [13] makes use of syslogd [14] and uses the SSH package to
forward logs to the server with encryption and authentication. Since this method has been
mainly designed to ensure secure log transmission, validation and authentication in the
event of an attack and measures to prevent the same were not explored; i.e., there is no
security measure enforced that can detect log tampering. Another architecture discussed
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in [15] proposes the use of IPTables to formulate rules that will limit UDP traffic to port
514, which is the port designated for syslog servers to run on. This method again does not
define any kind of resilience against attacks or tampering attempts. This method at best
simply defines a logging system that prevents any kind of attacks against the logging
server using SSH connections and permitting communication only with certain limited IP
addresses. There is no defense against modification of the log file should the system be
validly or invalidly accessed.
Other papers propose logging architectures specifically from the forensic point of
view for use in criminal investigations. In their research, Jiqiang et al. [16] present a
schema that describes a secure logging architecture from a forensic viewpoint. It
describes the entire architecture as a collection of interconnected modules, namely, host,
network, receiving, classifying, and secure. However, although the aim suggests securing
audit logs for use in forensic analysis, the method presented by the authors does not get
into the nitty-gritty of validating log entries and the manner in which they will actually be
scanned for their authenticity or tested for their genuineness. The authors’ suggestion for
the use of automated tools and data mining for analyzing the logs cannot really be
considered as an effective scheme for verifying a syslog entry for forensic evidence due
to the large number of false positives and false negatives data mining techniques are
typically known to generate.
The technique Snodgrass et al. [17] present for securing audit logs incorporates a
database management system to store logs, a cryptographically strong one-way hash
function to secure them, and a “validator” to judge if tampering has occurred. However,
this method does not focus on making logs viable forensically. Although this method
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provides a means for securing audit logs, it does not provide for validating the
authenticity of the source, of the transaction, or of the user that generated a particular
audit log. The opportunistic hashing technique used in their research is primarily a
database centric technique applicable to securing transaction records [17]. A single attack
on the database storing these records will result in the loss of every audit log. Given that
syslogs contain the greatest amount of data relevant to an attack, it will be a primary
interest for manipulation by an attacker.
2.4

Weaknesses of the Syslog Protocol
The weakness of the syslog protocol [3] lies in the fact that it uses the user datagram

protocol (UDP), a connectionless and unreliable protocol, stores system event
information in plain text format, and transmits system event data across the network in
plain text format. With regard to the three components of security—authenticity,
confidentiality, and integrity—syslogs can be manipulated by a malicious insider or an
outside attacker by exploiting these inherent weaknesses. Thus, all three components
expected of security can be violated.
2.4.1

Compromising the Authenticity of Syslogs

Syslogs typically contain an immense amount of information about network and
system activities. The immense size of syslog files, which is a valuable repository of
evidential information, becomes a vulnerability. Syslog entries are stored independent of
each other; i.e., there is no systematic chaining of log entries in a syslog file. Log entries
are, in fact, independent of every other item in a particular log file.
Additionally, there is no relationship between the system and the facility that
generates a syslog entry. Further, no authentication mechanism exists by which syslog
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entries can be validated and be claimed to have originated from one system and one
facility. By exploiting this, an attacker can send random and spurious entries to the syslog
file by spoofing source addresses, which could be either completely incorrect or spoofed
from a legal and authentic system. Tools such as netcat, crypt-cat, etc., can be used to
carry out this spoofing. In the event that several attackers carry out such planned flooding
in parallel, the impact would be sufficient to cause a denial of service attack against the
syslog server. Since syslogs seldom have a dedicated server, this kind of attack will also
bring down other applications that reside on the same server.
2.4.2

Compromising the Confidentiality of Syslogs

Syslogs are a lucrative source of evidence of electronic activities that happen in an
organization. In spite of this, as originally developed, syslog entries are still transmitted
in plain text and are even stored centrally in an unencrypted form. With the ease at which
open-source network tools are available off the Internet, a readily available tool such as
tcpdump can be used to sniff syslog entries being transmitted to a central logging
repository. By sniffing and analyzing these entries, an attacker, aside from attacking the
systems themselves, can determine precisely how to inject messages into the syslog file.
2.4.3

Compromising the Integrity of Syslogs

Syslogs that are stored on a central logging repository are accessible to only the root
user or the system administrator. An attack on the central repository and the procurement
of root access enables access to all the system logs. The logs are then open to one or more
of the following attacks—multiple entry deletion, malicious modification, abrupt
truncation, or complete deletion. Furthermore, UDP traffic can be sniffed, replayed, and
manipulated, thereby making syslog entries highly questionable. Attackers will often
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delete entries related to their activity to avoid detection. Simultaneously, this prevents the
syslogs from being effective forensic tools for legal admissibility.
2.5 Forensic Requirements
Dixon [18] identified the primary characteristics that computer forensic evidence
entails. These include:
!

Preservation

!

Identification

!

Extraction

!

Documentation

!

Data Interpretation

!

Confidentiality

!

Integrity

!

Availability

These are discussed in detail below as well as how our proposed techniques more
fully fulfill the requirement. The goal of our research is to integrate more of these
requirements than has traditionally been done. For instance, while secure log files add a
level of identification, they are greatly lacking in terms of evidence identification,
preservation, and extraction. Our proposed technique attempts to fulfill these first three
requirements for forensic viability while maintaining the confidentiality and integrity
provided by recent research in secure log files.
Bishop [19] specifies that any secure system needs to safeguard the following three
components: confidentiality, integrity, and availability. A compromise of any of these
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components will render the system as insecure. A syslog is secure if it maintains its
confidentiality, integrity, and availability. In terms of forensics, data will generally not be
forensically viable if the system collecting and storing the data is not secure as a starting
point.
2.5.1

Preservation

In our technique, the use of user fingerprints, application fingerprints, and system
fingerprints validates all the entities involved in the generation of a single syslog
message. The authentication traces stored on each system provides sufficient information
to backtrack an event that might have occurred.
2.5.2

Identification

Authentication traces can be exemplified as local, simpler, copies of syslog files with
the difference that they contain fingerprints and timestamps. When an incident occurs and
syslogs have to be analyzed, the local copies of the authentication traces can serve as
additional evidence to back up the facts presented by the central system log entries.
2.5.3

Extraction

The authentication traces that belong to a particular system must be stored in an
encrypted format. Thus, only system administrators would have the privilege to decrypt
and read the locally stored authentication traces. This greatly limits attacks, as individuals
will not know what they are attempting to attack. For instance, attempting to inject events
is difficult without knowing the contents of the files. Similarly, access must be limited to
read-only to limit the potential for modification. In general, system log files should only
be appended to in order to limit their susceptibility to attack.
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2.5.4

Documentation

The chain of custody after the acquisition of digital evidence ought to be documented
correctly.
2.5.5

Interpretation of the Data

Computer evidence is typically not in a human-understandable form. In order to elicit
appropriate responses from the jury, when digital evidence is very technical, an expert
witness is required to interpret these results in a court of law. The authentication traces in
our proposed method can be used as evidence to reinforce the prosecuted claims.
Computer forensics is a two-stage process that typically comprises:
The method presented in this paper tackles the first stage of this process.
2.5.6

Confidentiality

Confidentiality refers to the concealing of a resource or a system from entities that
“do not have the need to know” [19: 4]. The read access right for syslog files essentially
belongs to the system administrator who has root privileges. The administrator should not
be granted privileges to “write” to the syslog, regardless of whether it is stored locally or
centrally, because this would defeat the very concept of a syslog being a log of events as
they happen. This can be enforced through:
! Well-defined access control rights for system users
! Password files encrypted and not stored locally
! Encrypting syslogs
! Remote logging
! Modifying the location of the logging host in the syslog.conf file
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2.5.7

Integrity

With respect to a secure syslog, integrity refers to the trustworthiness of the data it
contains. It also refers to the integrity of the entities that generate the log entry, the
integrity of the medium that transmitted the entry, and the integrity of the system that
actually stores the data. The information presented by the syslog files should be accurate
and should be trustworthy enough to be used as evidence by a forensic expert or an
administrator. A syslog file that contains spoofed or tampered entries is not forensically
viable. Integrity mechanisms fall into two categories: prevention and detection.
Prevention mechanisms seek to maintain the integrity of the data by jamming any
unauthorized attempts to access data and modify it in unauthorized ways. A more
challenging task would be to prevent an authorized user from modifying the data in
unauthorized ways. Strict authentication mechanisms on the host and the server can help
enforce this kind of integrity check. More importantly, if remote logging is indeed being
used, ports on the logging server should be filtered appropriately.
Detection mechanisms on the other hand do not try in any way to prevent intrusions
into the system or in any way to safeguard the integrity of information stored on it.
Instead, detection mechanisms simply identify and log all accesses. Particular attention is
paid to identifying who made specific access, when the accesses occurred, and what was
done during the access.
Most contemporary systems today incorporate characteristics from both prevention
and detection. Essentially, the system uses access authentication to limit access but goes
under the assumption that no prevention technique is 100% accurate and thus also records
all accesses as per strict detection mechanisms.
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2.5.8

Availability

Availability refers to the availability of syslog data when needed. If they have
adequate information on log transmission, attackers can launch a denial of service attack
with the goal of preventing the central repository from receiving event entries.
2.6

Syslog Variants
In our goal to develop new techniques for creating forensically viable syslog

facilities, we examined existing capabilities to identify what existing work we could draw
from and build upon, rather than doing the entire research from scratch. The two existing
systems dealing with secure syslog facilities that offer the greatest capability on which to
build are syslog-sign and syslog-auth. Other variants such as syslog_reliable [20] and
syslog_ng [21] do not provide any form of forensic credibility.
While many of the below mentioned capabilities provide improved validation and
authentication from a security perspective, these improvements are insufficient for
forensic validity, i.e., for legal admissibility. These existing capabilities are not sound
enough to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that an attack occurred and the characteristics
of that attack. Extending current capabilities to this level is the goal of our research.
2.6.1

Syslog-Sign

This protocol defines three types of messages: normal messages, signature blocks,
and certificate blocks. It typically transmits to the central repository a signature block
after a certain number of syslog message packets have been transmitted [22].
The limitations of this system include the ability for an attacker to flood the syslog
server with plausible-looking messages, signature blocks, and certificate blocks [23].
Since the number of messages after which a signature block is generated is fixed, a wily
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attacker can eliminate the very presence of these signature blocks. This protocol warrants
the online construction of hash tables, which increases overhead costs.
2.6.2

Syslog-Auth

This version of syslog uses a shared-key principle. It works on the basis that the
syslog packets are encrypted at every hop using the keys of the previous sender and the
current recipient. The auth block comprises several blocks. Each syslog packet is parsed
from the beginning to the end of a block. This protocol is more suited for an online
analysis and, hence, is better than Syslog-sign [23].
The limitation of syslog-auth is a result of the fact that the key management is a
challenge since every device and relay has its own key. Further, the routing of messages
through different relays further complicates key management. Since an attacker knows
that the auth block is appended to a syslog message, the attacker can rip off the block
entirely, thereby destroying the authentication mechanism that the syslog-auth actually
provides. Finally, this protocol does not provide for origin authentication or validation.
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CHAPTER 3
THE PROPOSED METHOD
3.1

Overview of the Proposed Method
Figure 3.1 shows an overview of the system proposed in this paper. Currently, in

order for syslogs to be worthy of being considered as evidence in forensics, what is
needed is an authentication mechanism that reinforces and authenticates what the system
log file presents. The entities involved are the user, the application, the system, the client
syslog daemon, the authentication module, and the syslog server. The client syslog
daemon and the syslog server are not shown explicitly in this overview diagram.
In our proposed protocol, there are two servers, an authentication server and a logging
server. The authentication server records every authentication that occurs and maintains
their timestamps. Since this server needs to act as a form of backup in the event that

User

Application

Stores authentication traces for each
authentication communication that
User System happens between itself and the
authentication module

Authentication Module

User Authentication

Challenge-response authentication before
user, system, and application activity
Messages to alert termination of the
or
or logging off the user
application
system shut down

Sysloggingactivity from the
system to the server.

Figure 3-1. View 1 of overview of the proposed method.
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system logs on the logging server are tampered with or additional evidence is needed to
verify a claim, it will have a minimum number of processes running, limited accessibility,
and constrained resource availability. Further, this server can decipher the entries in the
individual prints and verify the authenticity of a fingerprint. The logging server stores
actual log entries and is the main storage system for these log entries.
In addition to the background processes of syslog generation and authentication trace
generation, which are umbrella processes that exist throughout a session, the proposed
approach comprises three main active steps.
User authentication: This is based on desired login authentication procedures and is
geared toward ensuring that only authorized users access the system. The user is
authenticated by the server.
Challenge response before the user, system, and application become active: This
step encapsulates and comprises the generation of user fingerprints, application
fingerprints, and system fingerprints. Furthermore, in order to cement and secure the
transmission of these fingerprints and the authentication traces, which are generated by
individual systems, several challenge response steps have been incorporated.
Messages log the termination of the application, logging off of the user, and the
shutting off the system: This is an authentication mechanism primarily focused on
ensuring that the same entity that has been granted login privileges has logged in and is
the entity sending event messages. However, with regard to computer forensics, a
mechanism to verify the termination of an authorized entity is also needed. This step
details a secure and logged termination of the entities involved in the generation of a
syslog entry.
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3.2

The Proposed Method
Our proposed protocol, exemplified in Figure 3.2, proceeds through the following six

phases:
1. User authentication
2. System connection establishment
3. System connection establishment response
4. Application event entry generation
5. Applications termination
6. System connection termination
3.2.1

Phase 1: User Authentication

This step uses the basic credentials that a user needs to log onto the system—their
user name and password. The authentication module verifies the authentication pair and
sends back an acknowledgment.

System Log Challenge-Response Authentication
Syslog Activity on the Server
Client
Syslog
Daemon

System User

Server
Authentication
Module

User's
System

Authentication Traces on
the Server

Authentication Trace Generated and Stored
After Each Message

1.A Username and Password

Server
Syslog
Server

1.B Syslog()
1.C OK
2. {Systemprint, Userprint,RandomNumber}
3. {Systemprint, Userprint, RandomNumber-1, NONCE}KSystem
4.A Launch Application

Application
4.B {Userprint, App_print}NONCE
5. {TerminateMessage, App_print, Systemprint}NONCE

.

6. {TerminateMEsage, Userprint, Systemprint}

Figure 3-2. View two of overview of the proposed method.
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3.2.2

Phase 2: System Connection Establishment

{systemprint, userprint, randomNumber}KSystem
The systemprints and userprints are used to establish the fact that a particular system
has logged onto the network and is being used by a specified user. The randomNumber is
used to emphasize the one-time nature of the communication. A validation mechanism is
in place on the server to verify randomNumbers and catch suspicious duplications of the
random numbers, if any, i.e., the random numbers should not be reused. The
authentication server would notice that that the particular random number has been used
already and more importantly, it has replied to the message.
Since, by definition, we cannot guarantee the uniqueness of random numbers, they
are not used in isolation. Even if the random numbers are repeated, the authentication
streams (here, digital fingerprints) that they are used to create will still be unique. This is
because the fingerprints, as previously stated, are a function of several parameters and a
random number is just one of them. More importantly, even if random numbers happen to
be repeated, the streams that they are a part of, namely, the fingerprints and the challenge
response, will be unique.
3.2.3

Phase 3: System Connection Establishment Response

{systemprint, userprint, randomNumber-1, NONCE}KSystem
This message is sent in reply to the connection establishment message sent by the
client. The use of the nonce here signifies the one-time nature of the communication. If
an intruder sniffed this message and tried to replay it, the replayed message would have
no consequence on the network, and would in fact identify the presence of the intruder.
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The randomNumber is the same as the one sent initially by the client. The nonce
functions as a kind of a one-time key to be used by the users.
3.2.4

Phase 4: Application Event Entry Generation

{userprint, app_print} NONCE
The nonce is used to prevent any form of man-in-the-middle attack. The key used is
the nonce transmitted by the server in the previous communication. The one time nature
of the nonce prevents an attacker from launching a man-in-the-middle attack since the
key is generated for each system uniquely and is meant to be of a one-time nature.
3.2.5

Phase 5: Applications Termination

{terminatemessage, app_print, system_print}NONCE
This message logs the actual termination of an application. In order to be able to
validate information forensically that can be used as evidence, it is necessary to be able to
validate the time at which an application has been terminated. Events received after
application termination would be indicative of an intruder or compromise.
3.2.6

Phase 6: System Connection Termination

{terminatemessage, user_print, system_print}NONCE
This message is sent by the client system when either the system shuts down or the
user logs off. This again aids in validating event entries and limits the ability of an
intruder to compromise the log reporting facility.
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CHAPTER 4
FIINGERPRINTS AND AUTHENTICATION TRACES
In physical forensics, fingerprints are one of the key factors that reveal evidence
about the perpetrator or identify key entities (people or objects) involved in a crime.
Creating digital versions of fingerprints of every entity involved in the generation of a
syslog entry promotes and emphasizes the need to make every entity responsible for
ensuring its forensic viability.
4.1

User Fingerprints
User fingerprints tightly bind the user and the system used. The user print can be

considered as simulating a real life fingerprint. When a fingerprint is considered in the
real world, factors such as location and time are also taken into account before arriving at
conclusions. Thus, for the cyber version of user fingerprints, similar types of information
must be included, i.e., user identifying characteristics, time, and system identifying
characteristics. This ties a specific user to a particular system at a specific time. More
specifically, we propose using the following to create a user fingerprint:
!

Username and password

!

System MAC address

!

Login time

Clearly, much of this information could be individually compromised or improved
upon. However, the compromise of these individual components should be identifiable.
Additionally, should the resources be available, more secure paradigms can be used. For
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instance, the Air Force requires use of physical access cards to log into any computer
system that would provide greater integrity than usernames and passwords alone.
Attempts to compromise the individual components would fall back onto typical
computer security paradigms. For instance, the server should identify the fact that the
time used by the client system is unacceptably out of scope with the server’s time. A
compromise of the system MAC address would be identifiable through duplicate MAC
addresses, the change in router paths to the MAC address, or detection of an invalid mac
address.
4.2

Application Fingerprints
Application fingerprints are similar to user fingerprints. The application

fingerprint will be generated for every application that is launched on a system. Their
primary role is to identify and distinguish between legal applications and illegal ones
launched by specific users on a system. As with user fingerprints, the goal is to provide as
much identifying information as possible. In this case, we are attempting to validate what
application is being run, by whom, when, and from where. Thus, application fingerprints
would use the following pieces of information:
!

Launch time

!

Username

!

System mac address

!

Application identifier

In a large system, every application on the system would have a different application
identifier. In our current view of the model, application identifiers are generated on the
fly, and the identifiers that are generated for each application are documented. As with
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system connection establishment, the randomly generated application identifiers are not
used in isolation due to the lack of guaranteed uniqueness of the identifiers. Further,
when application IDs are logged in authentication traces, they have the application name
logged with them as well to aid in differentiation.
4.3

System Fingerprints
System fingerprints are often used by operating systems manufacturers to register the

system on which the operating system was installed and ensure it is not transferred to a
new system in violation of the operating system license. The concept of system
fingerprints essentially relies on the fact that once deployed most systems rarely have
their configuration change, especially in business environments. For home users, while
some sophisticated users upgrade individual components of their system, the majority of
home users will not. Many different characteristics can be used to identify a system
uniquely. Some possibilities include:
!

The number of processors

!

Disk space

!

System mac address

!

CPU ID

!

Installed applications

!

Disk drive identifier, serial number

We have actually found that each individual hard drive has a unique serial number
that is installed in the hard drive bios that is generally read only and is accessible using
free programs available on the net [24]. This identifier should prove to be particularly
effective as a system fingerprint.
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4.4

Fingerprint Generation

User fingerprints, application fingerprints, and system fingerprints are generated
using the RS hashing algorithm, which is known to have low collision rate. The RS
algorithm, which is a general-purpose hashing algorithm developed by Robert Sedgwick
[25] is used to generate hashes, i.e., fingerprints.
Sedgwick’s hashing algorithm is a rotative hashing algorithm that uses rotative
hashing. In rotative hash functions, unlike its counterpart, the values are bit-shifted.
Sometimes combinations of both right and left bit shifts are used. For increased security,
bit shifts are sometimes prime numbers. The intermediate value that is yielded at each
step is added to an aggregative value. The result that is yielded is the value of the final
aggregation. An example:

hash

& hash

'1

% ( t $$

p ) # ( t "" q )

4.4.1 User Fingerprint Generation
For the user fingerprint, the key is a concatenation of the username, the time of user
log in, and the user ID that was generated when s/he logged in. Keys in a hash function
are required to be unique so as to avoid collisions and enable faster look up. The keys
here are concatenation of three parameters that will most certainly be unique across
logins in an organization.
The algorithm is coded as shown in Figure 4-1. However, different keys are used for
the user, application, and the system fingerprints.
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4.4.2

System Fingerprint

The system fingerprint is generated in the same way. We have found that the hard
disk serial ID that is hardcoded by a manufacturer is the only unique parameter than can
actually distinguish one system from another. The hard drive serial IDs, which are
assigned to every partition on the hard drive, were another parameter that was considered.
However, these IDs can be changed when the disk is reformatted. Another parameter that
was considered was the CPU ID. A run of an application on laboratory systems revealed
that all CPU IDs that belong to computers ordered in bulk are the same. The MAC
address was not considered as a potential parameter due to the ease by which a person
with reasonable computer knowledge can change and even spoof a MAC address. The
key used in this case is the hard disk serial ID. This was identified and verified to be

for(int keyLength=0;keyLength<fingerPrintKey.length();keyLength++){
long intermediateUserChar = (long) fingerPrintKey.charAt(keyLength);
fingerPrintH = (fingerPrintH << 4) + intermediateUserChar;
fingerPrintG = fingerPrintH & 0xF0000000L;
if (fingerPrintG != 0)
fingerPrintH ^= fingerPrintG >>> 24;
fingerPrintH &= ~fingerPrintG;
}
return (long)(fingerPrintH);

This user print yields! 155990563
Figure 4-1. User fingerprint generation.
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unique. Therefore, the hard disk serial ID and the system bootup time are together used as
a key for generating the system fingerprint. The system print is generated as shown in
Figure 4-2.
4.4.3

Application Fingerprint

The application fingerprint is necessary in order to validate applications. Here, a
concatenation of the username, application ID, and the applicationTimeStamp is used as
the key in the fingerprint generation (see Figure 4-3).
The extent of this implementation is the generation of the authentication traces,
digital fingerprints, and the simulated syslog entries. The implementation was carried out
with the aim of deriving a prototype of the proposed method. The challenge response
mechanism was incorporated as part of the remaining implementation.

systemFingerPrint(){
String HDDSerialNumber= "97LET9BET";
String
HDDSerialNumber.concat(systemBootupTime);

systemFingerPrintKey=

for(int
keyLength=0;
keyLength<systemFingerPrintKey.length();keyLength++){
long
systemIntermediateChar=(long)
systemFingerPrintKey.charAt(keyLength);
systemPrintH = (systemPrintH << 4) + systemIntermediateChar;
systemPrintG = systemPrintH & 0xF0000000L;
if (systemPrintG != 0)
systemPrintH ^= systemPrintG >>> 24;
systemPrintH &= ~systemPrintG;
}
return (long)(systemPrintH);
}
An example of a system fingerprint yielded by this method ! 161044579
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Figure 4-2. System fingerprint generation.
applicationFingerPrint(String
appLaunchTimestamp) {

applicationName,

long

applicationID,

String

for(int
keyLength=0;keyLength<applicationFingerPrintKey.length();keyLength++){
long
appIntermediateChar
=
(long)
applicationFingerPrintKey.charAt(keyLength);
appPrintH = (appPrintH << 4) + appIntermediateChar;
appPrintG = appPrintH & 0xF0000000L;
if (appPrintG != 0)
appPrintH ^= appPrintG >>> 24;
appPrintH &= ~appPrintG;
}
return (long)(appPrintH);}
An example of an application print yielded by this method!76274804
Figure 4-3. Application fingerprint generation.

4.5

Authentication Traces
An authentication trace is an entry that is generated on every system on the network

and records the generation of system, user, and application fingerprints along with the
associated timestamps. Authentication traces on each system can be viewed only by
administrators. The traces are typically a message along with the prints and the timestamp
of the event.
The RS algorithm, which is a general-purpose hashing algorithm developed by Robert
Sedgwick [25] is used to generate hashes, i.e., fingerprints. A test carried out [26] shows
that the RS algorithm had very few collisions when tested on a huge string data set.
Examples of valid and invalid authentication traces are shown in Figure 4.4.
4.6

NONCES
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A nonce is a number that is used only once. It is typically used in protocols that aim
to ensure secure communication and prevent any form of man-in-the middle attacks. The
transmission of the userprint and the app_print needs to be secure. For this reason, the
server generates a nonce that is meant to be used only for one transmission of the
systemprint and userprint. This prevents a replay attack. Moreover, even if an intruder
sniffed it, it would be of no consequence to the network.
For every event that occurs on the system on the network, the syslog daemon creates
syslog entries. The result acquisition in this research aims to be able to map back to the
true user, system, and application that caused the corresponding syslog entry by using

steena logged in at 2007-12-30 06:46:14 with user ID 3488469706175790508
user finger print
88726020 The system print is 94173252
C:\Program Files\Internet Explorer\IEXPLORE.exe

the associated authentication traces and fingerprints.

launched

at 2007-12-30

with
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06:47:26

with ID

4384844220178160764 with fingerprint

223266966

C:\Program Files\Internet Explorer\IEXPLORE.exe
terminated
at2007-12-30
06:51:13
with ID
4384844220178160764 with fingerprint 223266966

(a)
Incorrect login with username:
ghost occurred at2007-12-28 23:01:16
userID 2221344687639655740with userprint 238806054

with

(b)

Figure 4-4. Example authentication traces. (a) A valid authentication trace. More
specifically, the authentication trace of a user named “steena” logging in and launching
Internet Explorer. (b) The authentication trace of an invalid login.
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CHAPTER 5
ATTACK BACKTRACKING
5.1

Backtracking to an Attack
Syslog entries typically comprise the following parameters—hostname, facility,

priority, message, and timestamp. This implementation simulated a syslog logging
facility. The purpose of this was to compare an authentication trace and be able to get to
the fingerprint from the syslog. After an attack occurs, parameters from the syslog can be
used to obtain the corresponding entry contained in the authentication trace. An important
point to be noted is that time is a crucial factor in the generation of an authentication trace
and the corresponding syslog entry. The user, application, and system are the facilities
considered in this implementation of syslogs. Their priorities are hardcoded here since
this implementation mainly serves as an example and validation of how authentication
traces, and syslog entries can be used in tandem to trace back and form evidence. The
research in [27] suggests that authentication traces can be used to backtrack to an attack.
The authors of [28] show this can be actually carried out. This is because every parameter
that is considered in the generation of a fingerprint can be essentially obtained from the
corresponding syslog entry in the log file. Therefore, the authors demonstrate the way in
which attacks detected in the syslog entry can be backtracked using a combination of the
authentication traces, the syslog file, and the hash function (here, the RS algorithm).
The following authentication trace shows a login by user “steena” and the
corresponding syslog entry.
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\
steena
ID

logged in at

7524389880967786033

2008-02-06 12:49:33 with user
with

user

finger

print

155990563 the system print is161044579

C:\Program

Files\Internet

Explorer\IEXPLORE.exe

launched at

2008-02-06 12:49:41 with

ID

1524843500148472672 with fingerprint

88504721

The corresponding syslog entries with format host name, facility, priority, message, and
timestamp.

localhost 4

10

steena has logged in at

12

C:\Program

2008-02-

06 12:49:33

localhost 6

Explorer\IEXPLORE.exe launched at

Files\Internet
2008-02-06

12:49:41

Repeated bad logins at a particular system will yield corresponding authentication
traces and syslog entries. However, the occurrence of repeated bad logins will be logged
by the authentication traces and not by the system logs, unless they are configured to do
so.
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Incorrect login with username:
at2008-02-07 04:50:02

steena

with

56032638045929763with userprint

userID
188996098

Incorrect login with username: steena
at2008-02-07 04:50:28

occurred

with

8936243886107892818with userprint

userID
188996200

Incorrect login with username: steena
at2008-02-07 04:50:43

occurred

occurred

with userID

2404564924573438423 with userprint

188996163

An attack by a malicious insider causes the username, which is already known, to be
exploited. In this simple emulation of system logs, we have explicitly logged a bad login
instead of a series of repeated logins by a valid user.
5.2

Reconstructing Fingerprints
The user fingerprint comprises the username, the user ID, and the time of login.

These values can be obtained from the syslog entry. A hash of these parameters using the
RS function yields the corresponding fingerprint. The absence of authentication traces
only reveals the persistent login by user “steena.” A closer examination of the system
logs and its corresponding authentication trace can even possibly reveal the identity of
the person behind the attack. A small script to check and match users who have already
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logged in and their log in times can possibly reveal this. A more complex implementation
aims to assign appropriate priorities and facility numbers to every entity involved in the
system.
An important point to be noted while logging events to a central repository is that the
local system time for each individual system should be used instead of the server time.
This is because authentication traces are generated and are representative of activity by
entities on those individual systems. The use of server time would lead to
misinterpretation of events on those systems. This was noted during the current
implementation when entries were being logged successfully but had a clear disparity
with regard to timestamps in their corresponding authentication trace entries.
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CHAPTER 6
FORENSIC VIABILITY
6.1

Requirements of Forensic Evidence
Previous research has dealt with using digital evidence in a court of law as

documented in [29]. Forensically viable log files as defined in [30] requires that log files
be created and stored by keeping legal investigation procedures in mind. The three factors
to be considered when dealing with log files as evidence as suggested in [30] are:
1. Logs must be protected against losses. In the proposed method, the use of
fingerprints as well as the generation and secure storage of syslogs ensures the
integrity of the syslogs. This is done through a second source of evidence—
the authentication traces.
2. Evidence must be found within log files. The authentication traces document
the authenticity and validity of every entity and activity involved in the
generation of a syslog entry through explicit messages and fingerprints.
3. Log file information should be documented for additional judicial scrutiny
[30]. The explicit authentication traces serve as backup/reinforcing evidence
for syslog entries. These traces contain copious amounts of validating and
authenticating information in a succinct form.
6.2 Evidence Certainty Levels
The research in [29] assigns predefined levels of certainty to digital evidence
collected from affected systems with C0 having the least certainty and C6 the highest
certainty.

38
Digital evidence needs to have a degree of certainty attached to it in order to make it
credible, and thus for it to be legally admissible or accepted by a jury. A mapping of
these levels of certainty to syslog files is presented in Table 6-1.

Table 6-1. Mapping the Certainty Levels Defined in [2] to Syslog Files.
Level

Level
Confidence

C0

Erroneous/
Incorrect

C1

Highly
Uncertain

Relationship to Syslogs
Programmatic errors while coding the
syslog/sylslogd protocol [3]. An attack occurs by
exploiting this vulnerability.
A patchy syslog file with manipulated entries.

C2

Somewhat
Uncertain

In the event of an attack, the only evidence that is
available is the organizational syslog file.
Distributed evidence preservation—proposed in this
paper—has not been attempted.

C3

Possible

Syslog variants, namely, Syslog-sign and SyslogAuth, have this level of certainty.

Probable

Syslogs and authentication traces that are stored and
transmitted in plain text can be classified to have this
level of certainty.

Almost
Certain

This level of certainty specifies evidence to be
tamperproof and asserts a match between
independent sources of evidence, which in this case
are the authentication traces and syslogs. The
evidence at this level, however, can be erroneous due
to temporal loss or data loss. The currently proposed
method belongs to this level of certainty.

Certain

If authentication traces were validated at every
system that they were generated on and more
importantly, at intermediate stages in the routing to
the syslog server, syslog evidence would then have
this level of certainty.

C4

C5

C6
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According to Table 6-1, the evidence presented by the syslogs, which was collected
and generated by our approach, falls into the C5 level, given the authentication and
validation capabilities integrated into the model. On the other hand, typical syslog
capabilities and even secure syslog facilities achieve a much lower ranking. The log files
generated by this method can be termed as forensically viable as defined by research in
[30].
6.3

Use of Authentication Traces and
Syslogs Under Certain Scenarios
Authentication traces and syslogs can be used in other circumstances other than

backtracking an attack, which of course, is its primary aim. The three scenarios below
exemplify some of these characteristics. For these scenarios, consider the fictitious entity
SecurityVille. SecurityVille is an organization in which every user has a dedicated
system and a login username and password. Andy is the administrator; Fred is the
forensic analyst; Steve is the malicious insider, who is also an employee; William is a
wily external attacker; and Arby is another employee. Authentication traces are
maintained on every system and on the server. Syslogs are maintained only on the server.
6.3.1

Scenario One: Syslog File Deletion

The SecurityVille network has been taken offline due to an attack by William.
Knowing the immense repository of information that syslogs contain, Fred begins
searching for the syslog file on the server. However, William, knowing this too, has
deleted it.
The authentication traces serve as complimentary evidence. Although the
fingerprints are indecipherable at a glance, a further inspection of the authentication
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traces can yield an almost complete reconstruction of the syslog file, thereby showing the
origin of the attack, its modus operandi, and to a limited extent the severity of the attack.
6.3.2

Scenario Two: Spurious Entry Injection into the Syslog File
During a fortnightly inspection of the syslog file, Andy notices that certain entries

appear to be invalid, i.e., not matching the authentication traces. Clearly, someone has
managed to alter the syslog file on the server. The corporate network logs, router logs,
and switch logs do not reveal any suspicious activity. As it happens, the attack originated
from an internal source: Steve has managed to gain access to the server and injected
spurious entries into the syslog.
An inspection of his authentication trace reveals that he has managed to install a
rogue application on his system. His traces reveal the name of an unknown application.
6.3.3

Scenario Three: Application Updates

FortyTwo, which is an accounting software used by the employees, is scheduled to
undergo updates every two weeks.
In the method proposed here, before an application launches, it needs to go through
the challenge response mechanism. The application fingerprint is then calculated on the
fly. When the application has been updated and has to restart, its print is recalculated and
the restart is treated as the launch of a new application. Since application IDs are assigned
on the fly and are documented, the automatic updates would not affect the generation of
the application prints and their transmission. Currently, the authentication trace
generation has no mechanism to determine if an update has occurred or if the user has
merely chosen to close and launch the application again. However, a close examination
of the traces across systems and the system logs would reveal this update if a pattern of
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restarting an application is seen across multiple systems. Further, since the application
name is listed in the authentication trace, this pattern will be readily found. An
application update occurring while the application is not running would not lead to any
suspicious traces, the desired result.
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CHAPTER 7
PROTOCOL RESILIENCE
7.1

Attacks Against the Challenge Response System
We have previously discussed some of the weaknesses of the syslog protocol and

the ineffectiveness of secure syslog facilities for use when forensic viability is required.
Here, we discuss the specific capabilities of our proposed model and the resilience
these capabilities provide against typical attacks that are not handled by typical syslog
facilities.
7.1.1. Phase 2: System Connection Establishment
An intruder can easily sniff this phase’s message. However, the intruder cannot replay
it because the intruder would need to authenticate to the particular system from which the
intruder wishes to launch the attack. It is only after a user is authenticated and a user
fingerprint generated that this communication can be initiated. The user fingerprint
contains parameters known only to that user which limits the potential for compromise.
7.1.2

Phase 3: System Connection Establishment Response

Even if the message associated with this phase is sniffed, it is unreadable since it is
encrypted and can only be decrypted by obtaining the private key from the system.
Moreover, this is a response message, replaying it would not cause a successful attack
since it would require the previous authentication and connection establishment steps to
be completed successfully.
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7.1.3

Phase 4: Application Event Entry Generation

The nonce used to encrypt this message is generated by the server and is sent to the
system via an encrypted transmission. Even if the intruder replays this message, it will be
detected as a replay attempt due to the presence of the already-used nonce.
7.1.4

Phase 5: Applications Termination

At this stage, a sniffing attack will fail because of the encryption using the KSystem.
More importantly, Nonce2 is generated only when the previous challenge communication
is met.
7.1.5

Phase 6: System Connection Termination

Man-in-the-middle attacks fail since all the entries will be encrypted using Nonce2. If
an intruder needs to determine the entries and the prints, the intruder will need to sniff out
Nonce2, which is sent via an encrypted communication.
7.2 Attacks Against the Syslog File
The truncation of syslogs is currently a major issue. However, here the authentication
server maintains logs of every authentication and challenge response that has occurred.
Truncation in this case succeeds only in deleting the explicit entries generated by the
systems on the network. The attacker would not be able to delete the trace in the form of
authentication server logs that point to the entities and the authentication mechanisms
involved in the generation of those entries. For example, deleting a chunk of successive
entries from the logging server does not eliminate the fact that a certain event had
occurred since the logs on the authentication server still have evidence of every
communication that has occurred.
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7.3

Denial of Service
This type of attack floods the server and consumes available resources in an attempt

to disrupt logging activity. More importantly, if authentication and logging are not
separated, this attack has a better chance of being successful. In our proposed model,
proper syslog entries (those that report actual events on a system) are not generated until
a proper authentication is accomplished. Therefore, neither the syslog server nor the
authentication server allocate resources or even log any entries before a proper challengeresponse authentication can succeed. This protocol is therefore resilient against the denial
of service and flooding attacks—two very frequent attacks.
7.4

Abusing Privileges
A trusted user can abuse existing privileges and bypass protection mechanisms to

gain unauthorized access to the logging server and to the log entries themselves. In our
approach, every user on the network is required to authenticate to the server using an
authentication mechanism followed by a series of challenge response authentication. This
authentication mechanism does not permit any kind of unauthorized write attacks. The
write attack is eliminated on account of the user prints, application prints, and system
prints associated with every entry. Additionally, the server is designed to be appended to
only; any other modifications to the log file, insertions, deletions, etc. are considered
attacks.
7.5

Application Updates
In the method proposed here, before the application launches, it needs to go through

the challenge response mechanism. The application fingerprint is then calculated on the
fly. When the application has been updated and has to restart, its print is recalculated, and
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the restart is treated as the launch of a new application. Since application IDs are assigned
on the fly and are documented, the automatic updates do not affect the generation of the
application prints and their transmission. Currently, the authentication trace generation
has no mechanism to determine if an update has occurred or if the user has merely chosen
to close and launch the application again. However, a close examination of the traces
across systems and the system logs would reveal this update if a pattern of restarting an
application is seen across multiple systems. Further, since the application name is listed
in the authentication trace, this pattern is readily found. An application update occurring
while the application is not running would not lead to any suspicious traces, the desired
result.
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CHAPTER 8
CONCLUSION
8.1 Current Scenario
The proposed method provides a mechanism to authenticate and validate syslogs.
Although syslogs have been researched extensively from the security perspective, they
have not received sufficient attention from the forensics point of view particularly for
ensuring legal admissibility. The fingerprints assigned to every entity involved in system
log generation enables the validation of these entities. More importantly, since digital
evidence is treated in the same way as documentary evidence [31], a means to
authenticate and verify its authenticity is needed. The proposed method provides
resilience against common attacks launched against syslogs—system log truncation and
man-in-the-middle attacks, which are currently of the most significant problems,
associated with using system logs as evidence in court. For instance, the credibility of
system log files as evidence can easily be attacked in court and invalidated.
With the proposed method, suspicious activity by a malicious insider can be traced
back to him/her. His/her system identity can then be forensically verified by hashing the
values available in the syslog file and the authentication traces, using the RS algorithm,
and matching them with the prints in the authentication traces. This mechanism is limited
to tracing back to insiders only. The ability to trace back to an outside attacker is beyond
the scope of our proposed method, though the internal compromised identity would be
identified.
An important aspect to be noted is that the proposed method clearly satisfies the
following authentication requirements of electronic evidence documented by the
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Computer Crime and Intellectual Property Section, Criminal Division, United States
Department of Justice [5]:
1. Verification of the authenticity and prevention of the alteration of computer
records
This is achieved through the use of the authentication traces and the
challenge response mechanism.
2.

Establishment of the reliability of computer programs.
This is achieved through the use of application fingerprints.

3.

Identification of the author of computer-stored records
This is achieved through the use of user fingerprints.

8.2 Future Work
An extended implementation of this method should enlarge the prototype developed
in this research to for a wider implementation that uses the actual syslog daemon and a
central logging repository. In addition, the development of a sophisticated authentication
module would help realize several security features and satisfy several requirements,
which has been proposed in the above sections.
With forensic trace back as the prime focus of this method, the important feature that
should be focused on is that of successful attack backtracks. The accuracy of each attack
backtrack needs to be measured and tracked. This metric is of paramount importance due
to the sensitive nature of forensic evidence and the fact that this evidence can be used as
crucial evidence to incriminate the culprit.
In addition, the resilience of this method against the various attacks listed in Chapter
7 should be tested. The strength of the communication between the individual systems on
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the network and the servers lies in the security of the challenge response mechanism
proposed. The list of attacks mentioned in Chapter 7 is not exhaustive and should be built
upon as work on this method progresses.
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